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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-938 
CITY OF JAMESTOWN, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of 
Counsel), for Petitioner 
MARILYN FIORE-NIEVES, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Jamestown (City) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting the petition filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) for unit 
placement and/or clarification of the titles of Typist/On-Call Receptionist and 
Maintenance Mechanic II (part-time). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the ALJ's decision only on the grounds that the ALJ failed to 
consider the language of the management rights clause of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement and that the title of Maintenance Mechanic II is not encompassed 
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within the CSEA unit and, therefore, the ALJ should not have granted the unit 
clarification petition as to that title.1 CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision2 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to decide the exceptions. 
On April 2, 2004, CSEA filed a petition, as amended, for unit clarification and unit 
placement for part-time employees in the titles of Typist/On-Call Receptionist and 
Maintenance Mechanic II. At the hearing held October 7, 2004, the parties stipulated to 
the record and to the facts to be considered by the ALJ in making her determination. 
The parties agreed that the ALJ would consider the City's payroll data on the issue of 
regular and continuous employment and that the individuals employed in the at-issue 
titles only receive statutory benefits. The parties stipulated that the community of 
interest shared by the at-issue titles and those in the bargaining unit was not in dispute. 
The ALJ evaluated the payroll data provided by the City for the at-issue titles. 
The ALJ concluded that the Maintenance Mechanic II worked, on average, 24 hours per 
week and worked every week for the 34 weeks of payroll data analyzed. The four 
1
 To the extent that the City raises community of interest as an issue in its exceptions, 
we note that the parties stipulated at the hearing to a community of interest between the 
at-issue titles and those in CSEA's bargaining unit and that issue was, therefore, not 
part of the ALJ's decision. We, therefore, do not reach it here as it is not properly before 
us. 
2
 38 PERB H4003 (2005). 
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Typists/On-Call Receptionists worked, on average, 9 hours per week per position and 
31 weeks during 2003. 
The ALJ elicited from CSEA that it represents full-time clerical employees and 
employees in the full-time title of Maintenance Mechanic I. CSEA has, in the past, 
represented employees in the title of Maintenance Mechanic II and the title remains in 
Schedule A of the current collective bargaining agreement.3 Part-time employees are 
also included in CSEA's bargaining unit. 
The ALJ also noted for the record that the City's response4 to CSEA's petition 
raised certain ancillary issues that were not relevant to the proceeding. In its response, 
the City pointed out that the inclusion of the Typist title and Matron title5 into the CSEA 
unit was discussed during contract negotiations for a successor agreement and that 
CSEA subsequently withdrew the demand from negotiations. The City's response also 
asserted that the management rights clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement gives it the right to determine whether, and to what extent, the work required 
in operating its business will be performed by bargaining unit members. 
DISCUSSION 
The City argues that the management rights clause in the current collective 
bargaining agreement gives it the right to manage its business affairs and services and 
to direct the work force, including the right to determine whether, and to what extent, 
3
 Transcript, pp. 8-9. 
4
 ALJ Exhibit #2. 
5
 At the hearing, CSEA withdrew the title of Matron from the petition. 
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services will be performed by employees in CSEA's bargaining unit. From the 
management rights contract language, the City argues that CSEA has waived its right to 
complain in this proceeding about the assignment of unit work to non-unit employees. 
This argument misapprehends the nature of a unit clarification/unit placement petition. 
A unit clarification petition raises only a fact question as to whether the at-issue 
personnel are already included in the existing unit.6 Where the language in the 
recognition clause is general and is not title specific, the inquiry goes beyond the 
language of the recognition clause to determine whether any other contractual language 
either covers, or specifically excludes, the at-issue title.7 Where there is no relevant 
contractual language, the parties' practice with respect to the at-issue title, or similar 
titles, is reviewed to ascertain the parties' intent.8 
A unit placement petition is, in substance, a mini-representation proceeding 
calling only for a non-adversarial investigation and the application of the statutory 
uniting criteria in §207.1 of the Act to the facts found. While community of interest and 
employer convenience are factors considered in making such a determination, here the 
parties have stipulated that there is no issue regarding community of interest and the 
City has not raised administrative convenience. 
6
 County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERB 1J3049 (1992), confd sub 
nom. Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. PERB, 26 PERB 1J7004 (Sup. Ct. 
Rockland County 1993). 
7
 Town of Huntington, 33 PERB 1J3049 (2000). See also Rye CSD, 33 PERB 1J3053 
(2000). 
8
 Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist, 36 PERB 1J3046 (2003). 
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That the City retains a contractual managerial right, which we do not here 
analyze, to assign unit work to non-unit employees is not relevant to a unit 
clarification/unit placement petition. Here, the petition seeks a determination as to 
whether the non-unit employees to whom the City has assigned unit work are entitled to 
representation and whether that representation is to be afforded by CSEA. A 
representation petition does not interfere with the manner in which the City directs its 
workforce. 
The City also argues that the negotiated collective bargaining agreement defines 
the unit and that CSEA should have bargained the inclusion of the at-issue titles before 
filing the instant petition. As we held in County of Rockland:9 
Although public employers and employee organizations are 
encouraged to agree upon the composition of bargaining 
units, as well as the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees, when a representation dispute arises, PERB 
has the statutory duty, pursuant to §207 of the Act, to 
determine the most appropriate bargaining unit consistent 
with the criteria contained therein. Agreements between the 
employer and the employee organization regarding unit 
inclusions and exclusions are, accordingly, not controlling, 
(footnote omitted)10 
Therefore, the only issues before the ALJ were whether either of the at-issue 
titles were already encompassed by the recognition clause, or other language, in the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement and whether the employees working in the titles 
of Maintenance Mechanic II and Typist/On-Call Receptionist work with sufficient 
9
 28 PERB H3063, at 3143 (1995). 
10See also Bath Municipal Utility Comm., 37 PERB 1J3010 (2004). 
Board - CP-938 -6 
regularity and continuity to be considered for representation for collective bargaining 
purposes. 
Notwithstanding the City's exception to the contrary, the title of Maintenance 
Mechanic II exists in the salary schedule of the collective bargaining agreement 
between CSEA and the City. Where, as here, the title is included in contractual 
language, we have held, in a unit clarification case, that the contract is the end of our 
inquiry.11 The title is, therefore, included in the bargaining unit. We also conclude that, 
based upon the ALJ's calculation of the hours worked, the part-time Maintenance 
Mechanic II is eligible for representation under the Act. We, therefore, grant CSEA's 
unit clarification petition as to the Maintenance Mechanic II (part time). 
Likewise, the ALJ concluded, and we agree, that the Typist/On-Call 
Receptionists have a sufficient regularity and continuity in the employment relationship 
with the City so as to create a "substantial interest in terms and conditions of 
employment warranting coverage under the [Act]."12 We, therefore, grant the unit 
placement petition as to this title.13 
The City's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
11
 Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3007 (2000). 
^Somers Cent. Sch. Dist, 12 PERB 1J3068, at 3120 (1979). 
13
 Placement of four employees in CSEA's unit of 22 employees does not affect its 
majority status. See New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB 1J3034 
(1994). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the title of Maintenance Mechanic II is 
included in CSEA's bargaining unit and the title of Typist/On-Call Receptionist is placed 
into CSEA's bargaining unit. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ibhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS - CITY 
UNIVERISTY OF NEW YORK, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23958 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE (IRA CURE of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
FREDERICK P. SCHAFFER, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE 
CHANCELLOR FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS (KATHERINE RAYMOND of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City University of New York 
(CUNY) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that CUNY violated 
§209-a.1 (a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by dealing directly with 
an employee in the unit represented by the Professional Staff Congress-City University 
of New York (PSC). The ALJ found that CUNY violated the Act by negotiating an 
individual employment contract with Kishore Mehta, an employee whose title, 
Continuing Education Teacher, is covered by the collective bargaining agreement 
between CUNY and PSC. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
CUNY alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ's remedy cannot be read as 
requiring the reinstatement of Mehta. PSC, in its response to the exceptions, argues 
that the ALJ ordered Mehta's reinstatement and that, once reinstated, Mehta is entitled 
to be evaluated and reappointed pursuant to the terms of the individual letter agreement 
between Mehta and CUNY. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we modify the order and, as modified, affirm the decision and order of the 
ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and will be repeated here only 
as necessary to address the exceptions.1 
Mehta was hired in September 2001 as the Financial Manager of Baruch 
College's Division of Continuing and Professional Studies. Mehta was hired as a 
Finance Manager but his personnel action form lists his title as Instructor. The parties 
stipulated at the hearing that the official personnel records list Mehta's title as 
Continuing Education Teacher. Although the title of Continuing Education Teacher is 
included in the bargaining unit represented by PSC, CUNY thereafter requested that 
Mehta sign a letter of agreement setting forth his terms and conditions of employment, 
which states: 
Baruch College agrees to employ Kishore Mehta as its 
financial manager, on a probationary basis, beginning 
September 17, 2001 at an annual salary of $45,000. The 
1
 37 PERB H4599 (2004). 
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probationary status will be executed as follows: an 
evaluation review after three months, and end of probation 
review on March 18, 2002. 
Kishore Mehta will be entitled to one (1) week of sick leave 
(5 days) and two (2) weeks of vacation time (10 days) 
calculated annually. Additionally, he will receive holidays as 
noted in column #1 of the attached CUNY Employee Holiday 
Schedule 2001-2002. 
CUNY advised Mehta in September 2002, that his employment would not be 
renewed. His last date of employment was September 28, 2002. PSC filed a grievance 
on his behalf, which CUNY denied at step one and step two.2 PSC thereafter decided 
not to pursue the grievance to arbitration, the next step of the contractual grievance 
procedure. 
The ALJ determined that CUNY had violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act, finding that it 
was undisputed that CUNY asked Mehta to sign the letter of agreement and that PSC 
was neither involved in, nor advised, of the negotiations that led to its execution. As the 
agreement clearly contained terms and conditions of employment, including salary, 
probationary terms, evaluation procedures and vacation entitlements, some terms of 
which exceed those granted by the collective bargaining agreement to Continuing 
Education Teachers, the ALJ found that CUNY engaged in direct dealing with Mehta 
that was violative of the Act. 
2
 The grievance alleged that Mehta had been improperly denied reappointment, 
inappropriately appointed to an Adjunct Instructor (Continuing Education Teacher) title, 
paid an inappropriate rate of pay and had received other terms and conditions of 
employment inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. PSC argued that 
Mehta should have been hired as a Higher Education Officer and, because of that, filed 
the grievance pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure applicable to that title 
and not the more limited procedure available to Continuing Education Teachers. 
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In determining the remedy, the ALJ held that Mehta should be returned to the 
circumstances that he would have enjoyed had the terms of the letter agreement never 
been in effect. The ALJ did not order recoupment of any benefits in excess of the 
collective bargaining agreement, only that Mehta should receive any benefits under the 
collective bargaining agreement that were in excess of the letter agreement, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate, until he was "restored to the position he would have 
been in had CUNY not engaged in direct dealing." The ALJ also ordered that Mehta 
retain any benefits he received pursuant to the letter agreement that were in excess of 
those set forth for his title in the collective bargaining agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
CUNY does not except to the ALJ's finding that the Act was violated when it 
directed Mehta to sign an individual letter agreement setting forth his terms and 
conditions of employment, only to the remedy ordered by the ALJ. CUNY argues in its 
exceptions that PSC is now erroneously of the opinion that the ALJ's decision requires 
CUNY to reinstate Mehta to his job at Baruch College. PSC argues that the ALJ's order 
mandates that Mehta be reinstated to his former job and be made whole for any loss of 
wages and benefits. PSC further argues that, if the terms of the letter agreement that 
are in excess of the collective bargaining agreement are enforced, Mehta would be 
entitled to the evaluation procedure set forth in the letter agreement, which would 
require his reinstatement so that he could be evaluated in accordance with the 
provisions of the letter agreement. 
The purpose of our remedial orders is to make parties whole for the wrong 
sustained by placing them, as nearly as possible, in the position that they would have 
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been in had the improper practice not been committed.3 The gravamen of PSC's 
improper practice charge is that CUNY's direct dealing with Mehta is so inherently 
destructive of PSC's rights as guaranteed by §204.2 of the Act as to constitute a 
violation of §209-a. 1 (a) of the Act.4 
"Direct dealing basically involves an employer's impermissible bypass of the 
exclusive bargaining agent. Essential to a successful case of direct dealing is proof that 
the employer 'negotiated' with an employee or group of employees with a purpose to 
reach an agreement on the subject matter under discussion."(footnote omitted)5 To deal 
directly with individual employees on a matter affecting a mandatory subject of 
negotiations, as here, deprives employees of the right to be represented by their chosen 
negotiating agent.6 In County of Cattaraugus,7 the Board held that "an employer should 
deal with its employees through their representative and not deal with the representative 
through the employees."(footnote omitted) Direct dealing involves an employer's actual 
or attempted establishment of a negotiating relationship with one or more unit 
employees to the exclusion of the employees' exclusive bargaining agent. Thus, 
CUNY's individual agreement with Mehta as to his terms and conditions of employment 
violates §209-a.1(a) of the Act because such direct dealing is inherently destructive of 
3
 Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066 (1992). 
4
 Monticello Cent. Sch. Dist, 20 PERB 1J3067 (1987); City of Albany, 16 PERB 1J3101 
(1983). 
5
 City of Schenectady, 26 PERB H3047, at 3082 (1993). 
6
 Monticello Cent. Sch. Dist, 22 PERB 1J3002 (1989), enforced, 22 PERB 1J7022 (Sup. 
Ct. Albany County 1989). 
7
 8 PERB H3062, at 3112 (1975). 
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PSC's representation rights and the rights of the employees PSC represents. It may be 
construed as a message that unit employees would do better if they abandoned their 
bargaining representative.8 
It is, therefore, the violation of representation rights under the Act that is to be 
remedied here. To do so, the status quo must be restored; that is the parties must be 
placed in the positions they would have been in had CUNY not violated the Act. To that 
extent, the ALJ erred by not ordering the letter agreement be rescinded. As it was 
CUNY's direct dealing with Mehta in entering into the letter agreement that violated the 
Act, the letter agreement must be rescinded.9 
To remedy the violation found, requires only that Mehta be considered to have 
been hired, as a Continuing Education Teacher, pursuant to the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Any wages or benefits that he would have enjoyed under the 
collective bargaining agreement during his term of employment, that he was deprived of 
by the letter agreement, must be provided to him by CUNY, with interest, at the 
maximum legal rate. Mehta should also be reimbursed for any expenses that he 
incurred while employed by CUNY that he would not have incurred under the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement, with interest at the maximum legal rate. Such a 
remedy restores the status quo ante between the parties to this case. 
As to Mehta's reinstatement to his former position, PSC has already addressed 
in its grievance whether Mehta was properly classified in the Continuing Education 
8
 Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB H3045, at 3097 (1986). 
9
 See Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 16 PERB 1J3029 (1983), where an increase in an 
individual employee's salary, granted without negotiating with the bargaining 
representative, was ordered rescinded. 
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Teacher title and whether his evaluation, if any, and termination were conducted 
pursuant to the terms of the PSC-CUNY collective bargaining agreement. PSC there 
argued that Mehta should have been hired in a different title which would have entitled 
him to certain termination provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. CUNY 
denied the grievance at both steps on the basis of timeliness and that Mehta's rights 
with respect to termination were covered by the Continuing Education provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The issues of Mehta's title and termination have been 
litigated in the contractual grievance forum and that grievance was withdrawn by PSC. 
Those issues are, therefore, not appropriately before us. 
We have ordered that the letter agreement be rescinded. Therefore, contrary to 
PSC's arguments, Mehta has no entitlement to any procedures or provisions other than 
those set forth in the PSC-CUNY collective bargaining agreement regarding evaluation 
or termination. The appropriate remedy is not to afford Mehta consideration under the 
evaluation or termination provisions of the letter agreement, nor is it to reinstate Mehta 
to his former position or any other position in the PSC bargaining unit. 
However, to the extent that Mehta enjoyed benefits greater than those he would 
have received under the collective bargaining agreement, such as his rate of pay, we do 
not order recoupment, given the circumstance of this case.10 
Based on the foregoing, we grant CUNY's exception and modify the ALJ's 
remedy. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that CUNY will forthwith: 
1. Cease and desist from dealing directly with Kishore Mehta; 
10
 Brookhaven-Comsewogue UFSD, 22 PERB 1J3037 (1989), enforced, 23 PERB 1J7009 
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1990). 
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2. Cease and desist from dealing directly with employees in the unit 
represented by PSC; 
3. Rescind the September 2001 letter agreement entered into with Mehta; 
4. Make Mehta whole for any loss of wages and benefits and any additional 
expense incurred by reason of the letter agreement of September 2001, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate, for the term of his employment with 
CUNY; 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post 
notices to unit employees. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City University of New York (CUNY) in the unit 
represented by the Professional Staff Congress - City University of New York (PSC) that 
CUNY will forthwith: 
1. Not deal directly with Kishore Mehta; 
2. Not deal directly with employees in the unit represented by PSC; 
3. Rescind the letter of agreement entered into with Mehta; 
4. Make Mehta whole for any loss of wages and benefits and any additional 
expense incurred by reason of the letter agreement of September 2001, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate, for the term of his employment with CUNY. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTONIO JENKINS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25597 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
ANTONIO JENKINS, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Antonio Jenkins (Jenkins) to 
a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing his improper practice charge. The charge alleged that the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) 
violated §§209-a.1(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated 
§§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Act. Jenkins alleges that the District violated the 
Act by removing him from his assignment as a music teacher and placing 
another teacher with more seniority in that assignment and that UFT violated the 
Act by failing to resolve his grievance and because it "agrees that employees 
with more seniority [can] move teachers from their positions." 
Board - U-25597 - 2 
The Director dismissed the alleged violations of §§209-a.1(d) and (e) and 
§209-a.2(b) of the Act for lack of standing. The remaining allegations against the 
District were dismissed for lack of factual support to arguably establish any 
violation. The claim that UFT failed to resolve Jenkins' grievance was also 
dismissed for lack of facts to arguably establish conduct that was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Jenkins excepts to the Director's decision arguing that: (1) he should be 
permitted to interrogate the respondents; (2) that he hasn't had adequate 
discovery; (3) that evidence of a contractual violation may arguably establish 
coercion; and (4) that by failing to respond, the respondents have not established 
that they did not violate the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Jenkins' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
In October 1993, Jenkins was hired as a music teacher at Public School 
194. He taught elementary school music there until June 2004 when he was 
notified that he would not be the music teacher in the 2004-05 school year. 
On June 28, 2004, Jenkins was informed by Principal Michael Brown that 
he would have to get a license to teach music for the upcoming school year or he 
would be replaced. Jenkins and his UFT representative argued to Brown that 
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement supported their contention that 
he should be allowed to continue in the music teacher position the following year. 
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On or about September 9, 2004, Jenkins was assigned to teach first grade 
and a more senior teacher filled the music teacher position. Jenkins had filed a 
contract grievance in June 2004, which was apparently taken to the second step 
of the grievance process in October 2004 and resolved in the District's favor. 
Jenkins disputes UFT's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement on 
this issue. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 209-a.1(d) makes it an improper practice for a public employer to 
refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly recognized or certified 
representatives of its public employees. Section 204.2 of the Act provides, in 
substance, that once an employee organization has been certified or recognized 
"the appropriate public employer shall be . . . required to negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization." Here, Jenkins acknowledges in his charge 
that UFT is the certified representative of teachers in the City School District of 
the City of New York. Under the Act, the District owes its duty to bargain to UFT 
and it is UFT, not Jenkins, who has standing to bring such a charge against the 
District.1 
Section 209-a.1(e) similarly deals with a right afforded an employee 
organization. It is the right of the employee organization to insist that the public 
1
 New York City Transit Auth., 32 PERB 1J3061 (1999); Hauppauge Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3027 (1999); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist of the 
City of New York (McLaughlin), 22 PERB 1J3012 (1989); Board of Educ. of the 
City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Haas), 21 PERB 1J3018 (1988). 
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employer continue all the terms and conditions of an expired agreement until a 
new agreement is negotiated. Here, too, Jenkins does not have standing.2 
Section 209-a.2(b) is the corollary to §209-a.1(d), making it an improper 
practice for a public employee organization to refuse to negotiate collectively in 
good faith with a public employer. Here, too, the standing to charge a violation 
clearly belongs to the public employer and not to an individual employee. 
As none of Jenkins' exceptions can arguably be deemed to address the 
issue of standing, and for the reasons stated above, we affirm the Director's 
decision to dismiss those portions of the charge that allege violations of §§209-
a.1(d) and (e) and §209-a.2(b). 
While Jenkins has standing to allege violations of §§209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) 
of the Act, his charge fails to allege facts arguably sufficient to support findings of 
violations of any of these sections. Jenkins alleges that the District interfered 
with, restrained him in the exercise of, and used coercion with regard to, his 
rights under §202 of the Act. Essentially, he claims that the District did so by 
hiring a more senior music teacher. Without more, this fact does not arguably 
support a conclusion that the District violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
Jenkins' allegations with respect to the alleged violation of §209-a. 1 (c) of 
the Act add only that the District's action "discriminates against teachers with less 
seniority", "pits one UFT member against another", and "causes me to attack the 
union I am paying". In fact, Jenkins cites to several sections of UFT's collective 
2
 City University of New York (Queens College and Professional Staff 
Congress/CUNY), 20 PERB 1J3051 (1987). 
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bargaining agreement with the District which he alleges the District violated, 
pointedly making the case that his dispute is in the nature of a contract 
grievance. Indeed, he accuses the District and his UFT Regional Representative 
of using the hiring of the more senior music teacher "to justify not upholding the 
UFT contract". PERB is statutorily prohibited from hearing alleged violations of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement that do not otherwise constitute an 
improper practice.3 
The facts alleged by Jenkins cannot be deemed to arguably support a 
claim that the District sought to "dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of an employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of 
such [§202] rights". Jenkins states no facts from which we can conclude that the 
District interfered with the contractual grievance procedure or otherwise sought to 
influence how UFT handled Jenkins' matters. Therefore, the Director correctly 
dismissed the claimed violation of §209-a.1 (b). 
Jenkins' only allegations made in support of his claim that UFT violated 
§§209-a.2(a) and (c) appear to be that UFT failed to resolve his first grievance 
and that he disagrees with UFT's interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. These allegations fail to meet the 
required showing that UFT arguably acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad 
faith manner in dealing with Jenkins on these issues.4 Therefore, the claim that 
3
 Act, §205.5 (d). 
4
 See Civil Service Empl. Ass'n v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 
1J7024 (3d Dept, 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 
117017(1988). 
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the District violated §209-a.2(c) was properly dismissed. Similarly, Jenkins' 
allegations as to the violation of §209-a.2(a) do not arguably support the 
proposition that UFT sought to restrain, interfere or coerce employees in their 
exercise of their §202 rights or to cause the employer to do so. That allegation 
was also properly dismissed. 
In his exceptions, Jenkins argues that the Director's decision does not 
allow him to interrogate the parties to demonstrate that coercion occurred and 
that the Director does not demonstrate that Jenkins had adequate discovery in 
order to establish any violations. Our Rules of Procedure (Rules)5 do not provide 
for such pre-pleading discovery. Instead, the Rules require that the Director 
review a charge to determine whether the facts, as alleged, may constitute an 
improper practice as set forth in §209-a of the Act.6 As stated above, we find that 
the Director properly made the determinations required of him by the Rules. 
Jenkins' third exception is just a statement that he disagrees with the Director's 
determinations and, as such, is addressed by our discussion above. 
Finally, Jenkins argues in his exceptions that the Director does not 
demonstrate that the respondents have not violated the Act "because the 
respondents have filed no response to rebut my allegations". Since Jenkins' 
charge was dismissed in its entirety by the Director's decision, based on the 
findings that Jenkins lacked standing and allege facts sufficient to support the 
violations claimed, there was no requirement that the named respondents 
5
 4 NYCRR Part 200, et seq. 
6
 Rules, §204.2(a). 
Board - U-25597 - 7 
answer the charge. The obligation to answer arises only after the Director has 
decided that the charge arguably states a violation and further processes the 
charge. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Jenkins' exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
Vu^6tAc^i>^^-^^s^r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HARTSDALE FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-5418 
HARTSDALE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
GREENBURGH UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hartsdale Fire Officers Association, Inc. has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
Certification-C-5418 - 2 -
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Deputy Chief'.and Captain. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Hartsdale Fire Officers Association, Inc.. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HICKSVILLE SCHOOLS NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
. _ Petitioner, — ^ ^ — 
-and- CASE NO. C-5466 
HICKSVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hicksville Schools Nurses Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5466 
Included: All Registered Nurses. 
Excluded: Nurse Teachers and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Hicksville Schools Nurses Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GRAHAM SCHOOL CUSTODIAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 




CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Graham School Custodial Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5469 - 2 -
Included: Custodian, Cleaner and all other custodial workers. 
Excluded: Head Custodian 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Graham School Custodial Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, LOCAL 200 UNITED, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5475 






CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees International Union, 
Local 200 United has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
Certification - C-5475 - 2 -
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All bus drivers (regular, assistant, extra), school bus dispatchers, 
laborers, mechanics, mechanic helpers and driver-laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Service Employees International Union, Local 200 United. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
I " ) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, — 
-and- CASE NO. C-5477 
WARRENSBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
Certification - C-5477 - 2 -
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Instructional Support Staff-includingteaching Assistants and 
Interpreters and non-teaching employees including Teacher Aides, 
Greeters, Print Room Attendant, District Learning Attendant, Food 
Service, Maintenance, Transportation, Personnel, Clerical 
Personnel, Cleaners, Driver/Mechanics, Bus Aides, and Deputy 
Records Management Officer/Clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 2005 
Albany, New York 
lAAAsdis6u/^i ^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^ 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
